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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-2913 
____________ 
 
AJIYOSOLA AKANDE SOLOMON, 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
     Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board No. A072-168-877) 
Immigration Judge:  Steven Morley 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 17, 2017 
 
Before:  FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  April 6, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION** 
____________ 
 
 
                                              
 Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, 
assumed senior status on February 1, 2017. 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Ajiyosola Akande Solomon petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ (BIA) decision denying his application for asylum under § 208 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal under § 
241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and protection under Article 3 of the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT), as implemented by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16-18.  We will 
deny the petition.  
I. 
Solomon, a native of Nigeria, attempted to enter the United States in 1998 using a 
passport issued to Olaoluwa Victor Ibironke.1 He lied to immigration officials about his 
purpose for traveling to the U.S. and was sent back to Nigeria and prohibited from 
entering or attempting to enter the U.S. for five years. Three months later, Solomon 
reentered the U.S. as a nonimmigrant tourist, using a passport issued to Ajiyosola Akande 
Solomon. Solomon thereafter married Joanne Hamilton, a legal permanent resident of the 
U.S. In 2004, four days after Hamilton became a naturalized U.S. citizen, Solomon filed a 
petition seeking status as a battered spouse of a U.S. citizen (Form I-360), and applied to 
register as a permanent resident (Form I-485). Solomon’s Form I-485 application 
indicated that he had never been previously married, that he had never been known by 
any other name, and that he had never attempted to procure an immigration benefit by 
                                              
1 Although his true identity is unclear, see infra Section III. B., for purposes of this 
opinion we will refer to Appellant as Solomon.  
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fraud or been removed. On December 10, 2008, United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) granted Solomon’s application and adjusted his status to 
lawful permanent resident on the basis of his approved I-360 petition. 
On January 3, 2012, Solomon filed an application for naturalization under § 319 of 
the INA. On his application, Solomon disclosed, for the first time, that he had been 
previously married to Folashade Ibironke, but maintained that he had never been known 
by any other name. USCIS discovered that, at the time he married Hamilton, he was still 
legally married to Folashade, that in 1998 he attempted to enter the U.S. using a different 
identity (Ibironke), and that when he made that attempt, he was removed from the U.S. 
Had Solomon disclosed on his Form I-485 that, at the time he married Hamilton he was 
still legally married to Folashade, he would have been found ineligible for lawful 
permanent-resident status. Accordingly, USCIS denied his naturalization application for 
failure to demonstrate that he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence.  
In July 2013, removal proceedings were initiated against Solomon, who at the time 
of adjustment of status was inadmissible based on having sought an immigration benefit 
through fraud. At the beginning of the removal proceedings, Solomon submitted an 
application for asylum. Solomon claimed that he was persecuted in Nigeria for being a 
Christian and that he had suffered physical attacks. Ultimately, the Immigration Judge 
(IJ) found Solomon not credible and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and CAT protection. Solomon appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. The BIA 
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dismissed Solomon’s appeal, determining that Solomon was properly found removable as 
charged. Solomon timely petitioned for review. 
II. 
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) and (b)(9). We have 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Where, as here, the BIA adopts the findings of the 
IJ and discusses some of the bases for the IJ’s opinion, we review both decisions.2 We 
uphold the BIA’s factual findings if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and 
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”3 We review the BIA’s legal 
determinations de novo.4 
III. 
A. 
We first consider whether, under § 246(a) of the INA, the IJ lacked authority to 
order Solomon removed. Section 246(a) provides that “[i]f, at any time within five years 
after the status of a person has been otherwise adjusted . . . to that of an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Attorney 
General that the person was not in fact eligible for such adjustment of status, the Attorney 
General shall rescind the action taken granting an adjustment of status.”5 Solomon argues 
that § 246(a) bars the ordering of removal five years after a petitioner’s improper 
                                              
2 Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). 
3 Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 534 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 
4 Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008). 
5 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a).  
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adjustment of status. We disagree. The statute of limitations bars the “initiation of 
removal proceedings after five years if based on improperly granted [lawful permanent 
residence] status.”6 Solomon fraudulently obtained lawful permanent resident status in 
December 2008. His removal proceedings were initiated in July 2013. Because the 
proceedings were initiated within the five-year period, the IJ properly exercised 
jurisdiction over Solomon’s case. 
B. 
We next determine whether the IJ erroneously found that Solomon’s claims in 
support of his asylum application were not credible. An adverse credibility determination 
is a finding of fact.7 We will affirm unless the evidence “was so compelling that no 
reasonable factfinder could fail to find requisite fear of persecution.”8  
The Attorney General has the discretion to grant asylum to “refugees.”9 A 
“refugee” is a person unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of origin 
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”10 
Asylum seekers “have the burden to establish their eligibility for asylum through credible 
                                              
6 Saliba v. Att’y Gen., 828 F.3d 182, 197 (3d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). 
7 Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003). 
8 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992).   
9 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). 
10 Id. at § 1101(a)(42). 
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testimony.”11 If, after considering the “totality of the circumstances, and all relevant 
factors,”12 the IJ determines that an asylum seeker has not met his burdens of proof and 
persuasion, the IJ must point to “specific, cogent reasons” that support his adverse 
credibility determination.13  
Here, the IJ based his adverse credibility determination on Solomon’s inconsistent 
testimony, material discrepancies between Solomon’s testimony and documented 
evidence, and his evasive demeanor. We find that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s 
adverse credibility determination. First, as noted by the IJ, Solomon’s true identity is 
undetermined. Solomon testified at the removal hearing that his true name is Ajiyosola 
Akande Solomon, but he previously signed a sworn statement stating that his true name is 
Olaoluwa Victor Ibironke. 
Second, the IJ noted a number of inconsistencies that undercut Solomon’s claimed 
fear of persecution. Solomon initially testified that, in the four-year period after he 
secured permanent-resident status, he traveled to Nigeria three times. Solomon ultimately 
changed his testimony after he was confronted with documentary evidence showing that 
he traveled to Nigeria at least five times for a total of 140 days. An asylum seeker’s 
repeated willful and voluntary trips to his home country can undermine an assertion of 
                                              
11 Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003). 
12 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
13 Dia, 353 F.3d at 250; see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
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well-founded fear of persecution there.14 Also, at Solomon’s 1998 interview at the U.S. 
border (as Ibironke), he stated that he had no fear of persecution, despite testifying at his 
removal hearing that, one month before the 1998 interview, he was brutally attacked 
based on his religious beliefs.15 
Third, when asked, Solomon admitted that he lied under oath in the past to avoid 
removal and would do so again in the future. The IJ concluded that Solomon’s testimony 
demonstrates his willingness to “engage in post-[hoc] rationalization” and do “whatever 
it takes” to stay in the United States.16 Based on these inconsistencies there is substantial 
evidence to uphold the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.17 
Still, the IJ solicited evidence to rehabilitate Solomon’s testimony and bolster his 
claimed fear of persecution.18  Solomon produced medical documentation to corroborate 
an alleged attack, including a letter from a Nigerian hospital written 16 years after the 
referenced attack and a letter from a doctor in the U.S. But the letter from the Nigerian 
hospital did not identify its source of information or mention Solomon’s claimed injuries, 
                                              
14 See Jean v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006). 
15 Although we view inconsistencies between the airport interview and removal hearing 
with caution when the arriving alien is not proficient in English, see Balasubramanrim v. 
INS, 143 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 1998), Solomon is college educated and speaks English 
well. 
16 A.R. 103. 
17 See Xie, 359 F.3d at 242-43 (upholding an adverse credibility determination based on 
“inconsistencies and omissions” in the record). 
18 See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir. 2009) (“It is reasonable to expect 
corroboration for testimony that is central to an applicant’s claim and easily subject to 
verification.”). 
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and the letter from the U.S. doctor did not identify the basis for the doctor’s expertise. 
Solomon also produced unsworn letters from his friends, who were not subject to cross-
examination, and whose identities could not be established through passports, licenses, or 
addresses. After changing his testimony regarding how many attacks he reported to the 
police, Solomon testified that he could not produce any police reports to substantiate his 
claims. Finally, Solomon’s country condition evidence focused on the religious violence 
in northern Nigeria, while Solomon testified that he lived in the southwest. 
Because the evidence was not “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could 
fail to find requisite fear of persecution” we will uphold the BIA’s adoption of the IJ’s 
adverse credibility determination.19 Solomon has failed to demonstrate that the IJ or BIA 
erred in rejecting his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.20 
C. 
Finally, Solomon contends that the IJ conducted the proceedings in a manner that 
violated his due process rights. In this context, due process requires that aliens threatened 
with deportation have the “right to a full and fair hearing that allows them a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence on their behalf.”21  To establish a due process violation, a 
                                              
19 Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84.   
20 Because we, like the BIA, find that the credibility determination is dispositive of the 
issue of the asylum application’s timeliness, we do not reach the issue. 
21 Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 596 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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petitioner “must show that substantial prejudice resulted from the alleged procedural 
errors.”22  
Solomon argues that the IJ’s determinations that Solomon did not suffer past 
persecution or have a well-founded fear of future persecution indicate the IJ’s bias 
against him. Disagreeing with the IJ’s interpretation of the evidence is insufficient to 
demonstrate that the IJ’s ultimate determination was the result of bias or prejudgment.23 
Solomon also argues that the IJ’s failure to consider how Solomon’s migraine 
medication affected his testimony demonstrates bias. Solomon does not dispute that, 
before his direct examination, the IJ asked him if he was taking medication that would 
impair his ability to testify and that he responded that he was not. Solomon instead claims 
that he answered in the negative because he forgot that he took a pill the night before. 
Solomon did not reveal his concerns about the medication to the IJ until two weeks after 
the hearing, at which point he did not submit evidence of how the medication could have 
affected his testimony. Solomon did not produce such evidence on appeal to the BIA. In 
its absence, we cannot conclude that the IJ’s failure to consider the medication’s effect on 
Solomon’s testimony was a procedural error that caused prejudice. Because Solomon has 
not established that the IJ failed to act impartially or deprived him of an opportunity to 
testify fully, his due process claims fail.   
                                              
22 Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010). 
23 See Matter of D-R-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 445, 455 (B.I.A. 2011) (finding adjudicator is not 
required to interpret evidence in the manner advocated by the respondent). 
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IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will deny Solomon’s petition for review. 
